Reimagining the Criminal Justice System: A structural case for hybrid trials in England and Wales

28 May

Written By Elly .

Confidence doesn’t always arrive with a bold entrance. Sometimes, it builds quietly, step by step, as we show up for ourselves day after day. It grows when we choose to try, even when we’re unsure of the outcome. Every time you take action despite self-doubt, you reinforce the belief that you’re capable. Confidence isn’t about having all the answers — it’s about trusting that you can figure it out along the way.

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Elaine Obika

Brentwood, England

ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-4538-3259

Email: hello@menaraaspenadvisory.com

ABSTRACT

The criminal justice system of England and Wales is experiencing unprecedented delay, with the Crown Court backlog threatening the constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing within a reasonable time under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The traditional reliance on jury trial as the default mode of serious adjudication, while historically significant, is increasingly misaligned with the operational demands of a modern justice system. This article proposes a hybrid criminal trial model that allocates cases across judge‑only hearings, mixed panels, and full juries according to seriousness and complexity. To preserve fairness and legitimacy, the model incorporates an independent oversight panel supported by AI‑driven pattern analysis. AI is not used to determine guilt or influence individual cases; rather, it functions as a systemic auditing tool that enhances transparency, detects disparities, and monitors compliance with Article 6. The article argues that this combined structural and technological reform offers a constitutionally defensible path to restoring efficiency without sacrificing the core values of the criminal justice system.

Keywords

criminal justice; hybrid tribunal; judicial reform; adjudication; court backlog; mixed‑composition courts; legal architecture; AI‑assisted oversight

1. INTRODUCTION

The criminal justice system of England and Wales is confronting a period of acute strain. The Crown Court backlog has reached levels that threaten the practical and constitutional guarantee of a hearing within a reasonable time under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Delays of months or even years have become routine, with profound consequences for victims, defendants, and the wider public interest. The system’s ability to deliver timely justice—long regarded as a cornerstone of legitimacy—is now under sustained pressure.

Despite repeated attempts at incremental reform, the structural causes of delay remain largely unaddressed. The continued reliance on jury trial as the default mode of serious adjudication, while historically and culturally significant, imposes procedural and logistical demands that the modern system struggles to meet. Resource constraints, case complexity, and the cumulative effects of austerity-era reductions have further exposed the limitations of a model that assumes unlimited capacity for full jury trials. The result is a justice system that aspires to fairness but is increasingly unable to deliver it within constitutionally acceptable timeframes.

This article proposes a hybrid criminal trial model designed to restore efficiency while preserving the core values of the criminal process. Under this model, cases would be allocated across three tiers—judge‑only hearings, mixed panels, and full juries—according to their seriousness and complexity. The aim is not to diminish the role of the jury, but to reserve it for cases where its democratic and symbolic functions are most justified. By aligning procedural form with case characteristics, the hybrid model seeks to create a more proportionate and sustainable system of adjudication.

To safeguard fairness and legitimacy, the model incorporates an independent oversight panel supported by AI‑driven pattern analysis. Crucially, AI is not used to determine guilt, influence judicial reasoning, or intervene in individual cases. Its function is systemic: to identify disparities, monitor compliance with Article 6, and enhance transparency through structured, auditable data analysis. The oversight mechanism is designed to strengthen, rather than replace, human judgment, ensuring that efficiency gains do not come at the expense of constitutional principle.

This article proceeds in seven parts. Part 2 outlines the current crisis and its constitutional implications. Part 3 draws comparative insights from jurisdictions that employ judge‑led or mixed‑panel models. Part 4 sets out the proposed hybrid structure in detail. Part 5 examines the AI‑assisted oversight mechanism and its safeguards. Part 6 considers implementation and feasibility, including cost, training, and public acceptance. Part 7 evaluates the model’s compatibility with Article 6 and broader constitutional norms. The conclusion argues that the hybrid model offers a defensible and necessary path toward restoring timeliness, fairness, and public confidence in the criminal justice system.

2. The Current Crisis in Context

The scale of delay in the Crown Court has reached unprecedented levels. According to the Ministry of Justice’s official quarterly statistics, disposal volumes have remained broadly stable but continue to fall below receipts, meaning that more cases enter the system than are completed. [1] As a result, the open caseload has continued to grow. At the end of March 2025, the Crown Court recorded 76,957 outstanding cases, a series peak and the highest figure since current data collection began. [2] By June 2025, this had risen further to 78,329 cases, [3] confirming that the backlog is not only persistent but worsening.

The number of long‑delayed cases is equally concerning. By mid‑2025, 19,164 cases had been open for more than twelve months, [4] a volume that raises serious questions under the “reasonable time” requirement of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) UNTS 222 article 6 (hereinafter ECHR art 6). [5] The rationale for the reasonable‑time requirement has been repeatedly emphasised in both Strasbourg and domestic jurisprudence, including Lord Bingham’s observation that prolonged delay inflicts serious prejudice on both innocent and guilty defendants alike. [6] These delays are not confined to the Crown Court. Magistrates’ courts reported over 310,000 outstanding cases in early 2025, [7] demonstrating that the strain is systemic rather than isolated.

The consequences of these delays are profound. Victims wait years for resolution, defendants remain in prolonged uncertainty, and witnesses face fading memories and increased attrition. The Law Society has warned that such waiting times effectively deny “thousands of victims, witnesses and defendants” timely justice, [8] undermining both public confidence and the constitutional legitimacy of the criminal process. The cumulative effect is a justice system that aspires to fairness but is increasingly unable to deliver it within constitutionally acceptable timeframes. [9]

Several structural factors contribute to this crisis. Although the Ministry of Justice has significantly expanded capacity since 2020 — including increased sitting days, additional recorders, temporary Nightingale courts, and the flexible deployment of judges — these measures operate within, rather than alter, the underlying design of the criminal courts. The system continues to rely on a model that presumes the routine availability of full jury trials, a model that is inherently resource‑intensive and difficult to sustain under current pressures. The persistence of the backlog despite substantial resource injections indicates that the pressures are structural rather than merely operational. [10]

First, the criminal courts continue to operate on a model that assumes the routine availability of full jury trials, despite the significant logistical and resource demands they impose. [11] Jury trials require more court time, more personnel, and more administrative coordination than judge‑only [i]hearings or mixed‑panel models. [12] In a system already operating at capacity, this default reliance on juries creates bottlenecks that ripple across the entire criminal justice process. [13]

Second, the system has been weakened by long‑term resource constraints. Austerity‑era reductions in court staff, judicial sitting days, and legal aid provision have left the courts with diminished resilience. [14] Even modest increases in caseloads can now overwhelm available capacity. The pandemic further exposed these vulnerabilities, accelerating delays and creating a backlog from which the system has struggled to recover. [15]

Third, the increasing complexity of criminal cases — particularly those involving digital evidence, multi‑handed defendants, or cross‑jurisdictional issues — has lengthened trial preparation and trial duration. [16] These cases consume disproportionate court time, leaving fewer resources available for the steady flow of lower‑complexity matters that could be resolved more efficiently under a differentiated model.

Finally, the constitutional implications of delay are becoming increasingly stark. Article 6 [17] requires that criminal proceedings be concluded within a “reasonable time,” a standard assessed in light of the complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties, and the conduct of the authorities. [18] Prolonged systemic delay attributable to state inaction or structural inadequacy has been repeatedly held to breach this obligation. [19] The current backlog places the justice system at risk of widespread Article 6 violations, with potential consequences for appeals, compensation claims, and public trust.

Taken together, these factors reveal a system under sustained and unsustainable pressure. The backlog is not merely a temporary fluctuation but a symptom of deeper structural misalignment between the demands placed on the courts and the capacity available to meet them. Addressing this crisis requires more than incremental reform. It demands a re‑examination of the fundamental architecture of criminal adjudication — a task to which the next sections of this article turn.

3. The Structural Nature of Delay

3.1 Introduction: Delay as a Systemic Phenomenon

The persistence of delay within the criminal justice system cannot be understood as the product of temporary disruption or episodic strain. Although events such as the pandemic, industrial action, and fluctuations in case volume have contributed to short‑term pressure, these factors do not explain the enduring and recurrent nature of the backlog. The scale and longevity of delay reveal something deeper: a justice system whose architecture is no longer capable of absorbing the volume, complexity, and evidential demands of contemporary criminal litigation. [20] The problem is not operational; it is structural.

This distinction matters. If delay were merely the result of transient shocks, the solution would lie in temporary injections of funding, ad‑hoc judicial recruitment, or accelerated listing practices. Yet these measures have been repeatedly attempted and repeatedly failed to produce lasting improvement. [21] The backlog has instead become a chronic feature of the system, signalling that the underlying design of criminal adjudication is no longer fit for purpose. [22]

3.2 Structural Bottlenecks in the Current System

(a) Dependence on Scarce Specialist Labour

The criminal courts rely on a narrow pool of highly specialised professionals — judges, senior advocates, forensic experts, psychologists, and probation officers — whose availability directly determines system capacity. When any one of these groups becomes overstretched, the entire system slows. The delays in producing SARN and ABLB reports, as seen in cases such as Mehmet, [23] illustrate this vividly: a shortage of qualified psychologists created months‑long delays in risk assessments, with no contingency mechanism to absorb the pressure. This is not an isolated problem but a structural vulnerability inherent in a system built around scarce human expertise. [24]

(b) Document‑Heavy, Labour‑Intensive Processes

Modern criminal cases generate vast quantities of digital material — CCTV, phone downloads, social media data, body‑worn video, expert reports, and extensive disclosure. [25] Judges and advocates must manually sift through hundreds or thousands of pages, often to identify only a handful of case‑specific issues. This evidential inflation has outpaced the system’s capacity to process it. Without technological infrastructure to triage, categorise, and extract relevant information, the courts remain trapped in a labour‑intensive model that cannot scale. [26]

(c) Procedural Rigidity and Inflexible Trial Formats

The Crown Court operates on a procedural template that has changed little in decades. Trials are structured around a single judge and a jury, with limited flexibility in how judicial labour is deployed. Listing practices are constrained by courtroom availability, judicial diaries, and the need for all participants to be present simultaneously. This rigidity prevents the system from adapting to fluctuations in caseload or redistributing judicial capacity to where it is most needed. [27] [28]

(d) Outdated Infrastructure and Fragmented Digital Systems

Despite pockets of modernisation, the justice system remains technologically fragmented. Case files are dispersed across incompatible platforms; digital evidence is stored in inconsistent formats; and judges lack tools to efficiently navigate large datasets. The absence of integrated, AI‑assisted infrastructure means that the system continues to rely on manual processes that consume disproportionate judicial time. [29]

3.3 Why Capacity Injections Alone Cannot Resolve the Backlog

Successive governments have attempted to address delay through increased funding, temporary judicial appointments, extended court hours, and additional courtroom space. These measures have produced marginal, short‑term improvements but have not altered the system’s underlying trajectory. The backlog has repeatedly returned to — and exceeded — previous levels. [30]

This is because capacity injections treat the symptoms, not the cause. They do not:

reduce the volume of evidential material
streamline judicial decision‑making
create scalable processes
address specialist labour shortages
modernise the system’s technological backbone

Without structural reform, additional capacity simply pours into a system that cannot process cases efficiently.

3.4 Why Contraction of Jury Trials Is Not a Structural Solution

Proposals to limit or remove jury trials for certain offences are often presented as pragmatic responses to delay. Yet such measures do not address the structural drivers of backlog. They merely shift cases into a different procedural format without resolving the underlying inefficiencies. Moreover, they risk undermining constitutional safeguards and public confidence in the justice system. [31]

A sustainable solution must preserve fundamental rights while redesigning the system’s architecture to meet contemporary demands.

3.5 The Need for Structural Redesign

The analysis above demonstrates that the criminal justice system is constrained not by temporary pressures but by its own design. A modern justice system must be:

scalable, not dependent on fixed pools of specialist labour
technologically supported, not manually overloaded
flexible, not rigidly tied to a single trial format
efficient, without compromising fairness or constitutional protections

This is the foundation upon which the hybrid trial model — supported by AI‑enabled infrastructure and a reconfigured judicial workforce — becomes not only desirable but necessary.

3.6 Limitations of Current Reform Proposals

Recent policy proposals — including those advanced by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change — offer a range of operational improvements across the criminal justice system. [32] These include enhanced multi‑agency management of prolific offenders, deferred‑prosecution schemes, revised charging thresholds, joint police–CPS teams, expanded victim‑care hubs, and new community‑based sentencing options. [33] While these initiatives may produce incremental gains, they share a common orientation: they seek to modify individual behaviour rather than redesign the systemic architecture through which cases are processed. [34]

Much of this agenda is grounded in the longstanding ambition to rehabilitate offenders and reduce recidivism. Yet rehabilitation, however desirable, is not a structural solution to the chronic backlog. It is an attempt to change human nature — to alter the conduct, choices, and life‑trajectories of individuals — rather than to address the institutional design flaws that impede the system’s ability to function efficiently. The criminal justice system cannot be unclogged by persuading offenders to offend less; it must be re‑engineered so that it can process the cases that inevitably arise. [35]

Moreover, these proposals leave untouched the core structural constraints identified earlier: the scarcity of judicial labour, the evidential burden placed on courts, the rigidity of trial formats, and the absence of scalable technological infrastructure. They do not reduce the volume of material judges must review, expand the system’s capacity to absorb complex cases, or modernise the adjudicative process itself. Instead, they operate at the periphery — improving coordination, adjusting thresholds, or enhancing support services — while the central machinery of adjudication remains unchanged.

As a result, even the most well‑intentioned operational reforms cannot resolve the systemic backlog or satisfy the state’s obligations under Article 6(1). [36] The problem is architectural, not behavioural. What is required is not a recalibration of existing processes but a structural redesign of the adjudicative core of the criminal justice system.

4. Principles for Structural Reform

4.1 Introduction: From Operational Adjustment to Structural Redesign

If the analysis in Part 3 demonstrates anything, it is that the chronic delays in the criminal justice system cannot be resolved through operational adjustments alone. Additional funding, expanded sitting days, revised charging thresholds, or improved inter‑agency coordination may produce marginal gains, but they do not alter the underlying architecture of adjudication. A system designed around a single, resource‑intensive trial format — dependent on scarce judicial labour, rigid listing practices, and manual evidential processing — cannot scale to meet contemporary demand. Structural problems require structural solutions.

This section sets out the principles that should guide any credible programme of structural reform. These principles form the conceptual foundation for the hybrid tribunal model advanced in Part 5.

4.2 Scalability: A System Capable of Absorbing Fluctuations in Caseload

A modern justice system must be capable of expanding and contracting in response to changes in caseload without compromising fairness or efficiency. The current model, built around a single judge and a jury, offers no such flexibility. When demand increases, the system has no alternative configuration to absorb the pressure; delay becomes inevitable.

Structural reform must therefore introduce multiple adjudicative formats, each matched to the seriousness and complexity of the case. This requires a broader pool of judicial decision‑makers and a more modular approach to trial design. Scalability is not a luxury; it is a constitutional necessity in a system bound by Article 6(1).

4.3 Resilience: Reducing Dependence on Scarce Specialist Labour

The system’s fragility stems in part from its dependence on a narrow cohort of highly specialised judges. When even a small number are unavailable — due to illness, retirement, or competing demands — the entire system slows. A resilient system must diversify its sources of judicial labour.

This does not mean lowering standards. It means recognising that experienced barristers, legal academics, and other legally qualified professionals possess the expertise necessary to contribute meaningfully to adjudication when appropriately trained and deployed. Structural reform must therefore create a second tier of judicial capacity, capable of supporting and supplementing the existing judiciary.

4.4 Efficiency: Reducing the Cognitive and Administrative Burden on Judges

Judges currently spend disproportionate time on tasks that do not require judicial expertise: navigating vast digital datasets, reviewing repetitive material, and managing administrative processes. This is an inefficient use of scarce judicial labour.

Structural reform must incorporate technological infrastructure, including AI‑assisted tools for:

evidential triage
document summarisation
pattern identification
administrative workflow support

These tools do not replace judicial decision‑making; they enhance it by allowing judges to focus on the tasks that require human judgment.

4.5 Flexibility: Moving Beyond a Single Procedural Template

The rigidity of the current procedural model — with its fixed trial format, strict listing constraints, and dependence on courtroom availability — prevents the system from adapting to fluctuations in demand. Flexibility requires:

alternative tribunal compositions
adaptable listing practices
the ability to redistribute judicial labour
procedural models that vary by case type

A flexible system is one that can reconfigure itself without compromising fairness.

4.6 Constitutional Integrity: Preserving Jury Trials Where They Matter Most

Structural reform must not come at the expense of constitutional rights. Jury trial remains a cornerstone of the criminal justice system for the most serious offences. Any redesign must therefore preserve the jury’s role while creating alternative structures for cases that do not require the full weight of the traditional model.

This principle ensures that reform enhances, rather than diminishes, the legitimacy of the system.

4.7 Coherence: Aligning Structure With Purpose

Finally, structural reform must be coherent. It must align the system’s design with its constitutional purpose: to deliver fair, timely, and effective justice. A system that cannot process cases within a reasonable time is not merely inefficient; it is constitutionally defective. Coherence requires that the architecture of adjudication reflect the realities of modern criminal litigation.

4.8 Structural Reform Requires Structural Investment

Any programme of structural reform will require sustained financial investment. But the critical point is that this investment must be directed at the architecture of adjudication itself, rather than dispersed across individual agencies in short‑term, reactive cycles. For more than a decade, funding has been allocated episodically — a boost to the CPS one year, additional sitting days the next, a digital pilot the year after — without altering the underlying design of the system. This pattern produces expenditure without transformation. Structural delay cannot be resolved by injecting money into isolated departments; it requires investment in a redesigned system capable of processing cases efficiently, consistently, and at scale. The question is not whether money is needed, but whether it is spent on structural capacity rather than operational firefighting.

4.9 Conclusion: The Case for a New Adjudicative Architecture

Taken together, these principles point toward the need for a redesigned adjudicative structure — one that is scalable, resilient, efficient, flexible, constitutionally grounded, and coherent. The hybrid tribunal model proposed in Part 5 is designed to meet these criteria. It offers a structural solution to a structural problem, addressing the systemic weaknesses identified in Part 3 while preserving the fundamental values of the criminal justice system.

5. The Hybrid Tribunal Model

5.1 Introduction: A Structural Solution to a Structural Problem

If the criminal justice system is to meet its constitutional obligation to deliver timely trials, it requires an adjudicative architecture capable of scaling, adapting, and absorbing fluctuations in caseload. The traditional Crown Court model — a single judge and a jury — remains essential for the most serious offences, but it is too resource‑intensive and inflexible to serve as the default for all indictable matters. The hybrid tribunal model proposed here offers a structural alternative: a second, parallel adjudicative pathway designed to relieve pressure on the Crown Court while preserving fairness, independence, and public confidence.

5.2 Composition of the Hybrid Tribunal

The hybrid tribunal consists of:

One Crown Court judge (chairing and directing proceedings)
Two legally qualified members, drawn from a regulated pool of:

senior barristers
legal academics
experienced solicitors with higher‑rights advocacy
retired judges or recorders

These members would be appointed through a transparent, merit‑based process overseen by the Judicial Appointments Commission, with training tailored to the adjudicative functions they will perform.

Why this composition works

It preserves judicial authority and independence.
It introduces additional judicial capacity without diluting standards.
It mirrors successful mixed‑tribunal models used across Europe.
It allows the system to scale by drawing on a broader pool of legal expertise.

This is not a dilution of justice; it is an expansion of judicial capability.

5.3 Jurisdiction: Which Cases Belong in the Hybrid Tribunal?

The hybrid tribunal is designed for mid‑level indictable offences where:

the factual issues are clear
the legal issues are manageable
the sentencing range is significant but not at the highest end
the public interest does not require a jury

Examples include:

burglary
non‑aggravated fraud
drug supply (non‑organised)
assault occasioning actual bodily harm
theft and handling
criminal damage
certain driving offences

The most serious offences — homicide, rape, terrorism, large‑scale organised crime — remain exclusively within the traditional jury model.

This preserves the constitutional role of the jury while relieving the Crown Court of cases that do not require its full procedural weight.

5.4 Procedural Design: A More Flexible Adjudicative Format

The hybrid tribunal operates with:

streamlined evidential management
AI‑assisted document triage
flexible listing practices
reduced reliance on courtroom availability
greater capacity to reassign tribunal members

Because the tribunal does not require a jury, it avoids the most rigid listing constraints. Cases can be listed:

more quickly
more flexibly
with fewer collapses
with greater resilience to illness, absence, or diary clashes

This is the structural flexibility the current system lacks.

5.5 The Role of AI: Infrastructure, Not Adjudication

AI does not replace judicial decision‑making. It supports it.

The hybrid tribunal incorporates AI tools for:

evidential triage (identifying relevant material)
document summarisation
pattern recognition in digital evidence
case‑management optimisation
listing support

This reduces the cognitive and administrative burden on judges and tribunal members, allowing them to focus on the evaluative tasks that require human judgment.

AI becomes the infrastructure that makes the hybrid model efficient, not a substitute for adjudication.

5.6 Safeguards: Ensuring Fairness and Legitimacy

To maintain public confidence, the hybrid tribunal includes:

full rights of appeal to the Court of Appeal
transparent reasoning requirements
judicial oversight by the presiding judge
strict appointment and training standards
procedural parity with Crown Court trials

These safeguards ensure that the hybrid tribunal is not a “second‑class” forum but a constitutionally robust alternative pathway.

5.7 Expected Impact: A Scalable, Resilient, Modern System

The hybrid tribunal model delivers:

(a) Scalability

A larger pool of adjudicators allows the system to expand capacity rapidly.

(b) Resilience

Absences, illness, and diary clashes no longer collapse trials.

(c) Efficiency

AI‑supported processes reduce judicial workload and accelerate case progression.

(d) Flexibility

Multiple adjudicative formats allow the system to match resources to case type.

(e) Preservation of Jury Trials

The most serious offences retain the full constitutional protection of a jury.

(f) Reduction of Backlogs

By diverting mid‑level cases away from the traditional model, the Crown Court can focus on the cases that truly require its full procedural weight.

5.8 Alignment with European Practice and Broadening the Judicial Pipeline

The hybrid tribunal model aligns the United Kingdom with established European adjudicative practice, where mixed panels of professional and legally qualified members are the norm rather than the exception. Across Germany, France, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian jurisdictions, criminal cases are routinely heard by panels comprising a combination of judges, legally trained assessors, and lay members. Supranational courts such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union also rely on multi‑judge formations supported by specialist legal officers, rapporteurs, and registry lawyers. These structures enable courts to process complex caseloads efficiently while maintaining high standards of fairness and reasoning. [37]

By contrast, the UK’s reliance on a single‑judge model for serious criminal cases is an outlier. It concentrates adjudicative responsibility in a small, highly specialised, and socially narrow cohort. While the quality of the judiciary is rightly respected, the pathway to judicial office remains unusually restrictive. Structural reform offers an opportunity to broaden the judicial pipeline — not by lowering standards, but by recognising that legal ability, analytical skill, and sound judgment are not confined to a narrow social or educational elite. A hybrid tribunal model creates space for experienced barristers, legal academics, and other qualified professionals to contribute meaningfully to adjudication, expanding capacity while enhancing representativeness.

This is not merely a question of efficiency. It is a question of legitimacy. A justice system that draws on a wider range of talent — one that recognises ability wherever it is found — is better equipped to reflect the society it serves. Structural reform therefore carries a democratic as well as a practical value: it opens judicial office to those whose potential might otherwise remain unseen.

5.9 Collective Adjudication Without a Jury for Mid‑Level Offences

The hybrid tribunal model replaces the jury only for mid‑level offences, not for the most serious crimes. In these cases, collective adjudication is preserved through a panel composed of a Crown Court judge and two legally qualified members drawn from a broader, more accessible pool of legal talent. This structure blends elite judicial expertise with the analytical skill of experienced barristers, legal academics, and other qualified professionals, ensuring that decision‑making remains rigorous, independent, and deliberative. By removing the need for a jury in cases where it is not constitutionally essential, the system eliminates one of the most rigid and resource‑intensive components of the current model. The result is a form of collective judgment that is fair, efficient, and structurally resilient, while preserving the jury’s role for the most serious offences where public participation carries constitutional significance.

5.10 Representativeness and the Modern Expression of Public Participation

The hybrid tribunal model also preserves the underlying democratic value that originally justified the jury: representativeness. The traditional jury of twelve was designed to reflect the community’s voice in the administration of justice, ensuring that criminal adjudication was not the exclusive domain of a narrow professional elite. While the hybrid tribunal replaces the jury for mid‑level offences, it retains this principle in a modernised form. By drawing tribunal members from a broader, more diverse pool of legally qualified professionals — including barristers, solicitors, academics, and retired judges — the model introduces a wider range of perspectives and experiences into the decision‑making process. This approach maintains the spirit of public participation while ensuring that adjudication remains legally rigorous, procedurally consistent, and structurally resilient. For the most serious offences, where the symbolic and constitutional importance of lay participation remains paramount, the traditional jury is preserved.

5.11 Conclusion: A New Architecture for Criminal Justice

The hybrid tribunal model offers a structural solution to a structural problem. It preserves the constitutional core of the criminal justice system while introducing the flexibility, scalability, and resilience required to meet contemporary demands. It is not a departure from the principles of fairness and independence; it is their modern expression.

6. Implementation and Transition

6.1 Introduction: From Concept to Practice

Structural reform succeeds only when it is introduced through a deliberate, phased, and well‑supported transition. The hybrid tribunal model is designed to integrate with existing institutions rather than replace them. Its implementation therefore requires a combination of legislative change, administrative restructuring, and investment in training and technological infrastructure. This section outlines a practical pathway for introducing the hybrid tribunal model in a way that is controlled, constitutionally secure, and operationally feasible.

6.2 Legislative Framework

The first step is a statutory foundation. Parliament would need to enact legislation:

establishing the hybrid tribunal as a recognised adjudicative body
defining its jurisdiction
setting out appointment criteria for tribunal members
specifying procedural safeguards
preserving the exclusive role of the jury for the most serious offences

This legislative clarity ensures that the hybrid tribunal operates with full constitutional legitimacy and avoids any ambiguity about its authority or relationship to the Crown Court.

6.3 Appointment and Training of Tribunal Members

A credible hybrid tribunal requires a robust system for selecting and preparing its legally qualified members. This involves:

Judicial Appointments Commission oversight to ensure transparency and merit‑based selection
Eligibility criteria focused on legal expertise, analytical skill, and independence
Structured training programmes covering adjudicative reasoning, evidence, procedure, and ethics
Ongoing professional development, mirroring the expectations placed on judges

This approach broadens the judicial pipeline while maintaining the standards essential to public confidence.

6.4 Pilot Courts: Controlled Introduction and Evaluation

Reform of this scale benefits from a phased rollout. The hybrid tribunal model should be introduced initially in a small number of pilot courts selected for:

high caseload pressure
diverse offence profiles
operational readiness
willingness to participate in innovation

Pilot courts allow the system to:

test procedural design
refine training
evaluate efficiency gains
identify operational challenges
gather empirical data

A formal evaluation period — ideally 18 to 24 months — would provide evidence to support national expansion.

6.5 Integration of AI Infrastructure

The hybrid tribunal model relies on AI as a support mechanism, not a decision‑maker. Implementation therefore requires:

secure, court‑approved AI tools for evidential triage and document summarisation
integration with existing HMCTS digital systems
clear protocols governing data handling, transparency, and judicial oversight
training for judges, tribunal members, and court staff

The aim is to reduce administrative burden and accelerate case preparation while maintaining full human control over adjudication.

6.6 Administrative and Listing Reform

The hybrid tribunal cannot succeed without corresponding changes to court administration. This includes:

flexible listing practices that take advantage of the tribunal’s reduced dependency on jury availability
improved coordination between HMCTS, CPS, defence practitioners, and probation
digital scheduling tools capable of reallocating tribunal members efficiently
contingency planning to prevent trial collapse due to illness or diary clashes

These changes enhance the system’s resilience and ensure that the hybrid tribunal delivers the efficiency gains it is designed to achieve.

6.7 Resource Allocation and Structural Investment

Introducing the hybrid tribunal requires investment, but the key is structural investment, not the reactive, department‑specific funding cycles that have characterised the last decade. Resources should be directed toward:

training and appointment of tribunal members
AI infrastructure
administrative reform
pilot court evaluation
long‑term capacity building

This investment strengthens the architecture of adjudication rather than temporarily patching operational gaps.

6.8 National Rollout and Long‑Term Integration

Following successful pilot evaluation, the hybrid tribunal can be expanded nationally through:

staged regional rollout
incremental jurisdictional expansion
integration into judicial career pathways
ongoing monitoring of fairness, efficiency, and public confidence

Over time, the hybrid tribunal becomes a permanent, flexible component of the criminal justice system — a structural complement to the traditional Crown Court model.

6.9 Conclusion: A Realistic Path to Structural Transformation

The hybrid tribunal model is not a theoretical exercise. It is a practical, phased, and constitutionally grounded reform capable of addressing the systemic delays identified in Part 3. Through legislative clarity, careful appointment processes, technological support, and controlled implementation, the model offers a realistic pathway to a more scalable, resilient, and efficient criminal justice system. Structural problems demand structural solutions, and the hybrid tribunal provides precisely that.

7. Conclusion

The criminal justice system cannot meet its constitutional obligations through incremental adjustments or short‑term operational fixes. The challenges identified in this article — chronic delay, structural fragility, and an over‑extended judicial labour model — are not the product of isolated failures but of an adjudicative architecture that has remained largely unchanged despite profound shifts in caseload, complexity, and societal expectation. Structural problems demand structural solutions.

The hybrid tribunal model offers precisely that. By introducing a parallel adjudicative pathway grounded in collective decision‑making, broader judicial participation, and modern technological support, the model provides a scalable and resilient alternative to the traditional single‑judge, jury‑dependent format. It preserves the jury for the most serious offences, where its constitutional and symbolic value remains essential, while enabling mid‑level cases to be resolved through a panel that blends judicial expertise with a wider pool of legal talent. In doing so, it modernises the principle of representativeness and aligns the United Kingdom with established European practice.

Implementation will require legislative clarity, investment in training and infrastructure, and a phased, evidence‑based rollout. But the pathway is realistic, controlled, and achievable. The hybrid tribunal model strengthens fairness, enhances efficiency, and restores the system’s capacity to deliver timely justice — not through temporary injections of funding, but through a re‑designed architecture capable of meeting contemporary demands.

A justice system that cannot deliver justice in time ultimately fails to deliver justice at all. The hybrid tribunal model provides a principled, practical, and future‑focused framework for ensuring that the criminal courts remain both constitutionally grounded and operationally fit for purpose. It is a structural reform for a structural age.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks colleagues and reviewers who provided insight during the development of this article. All views and any errors remain the author’s own.

References

[1] Ministry of Justice Criminal Court Statistics Quarterly: January to March 2025 < https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2025/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2025 >accessed 14th January 2026.

2 Ministry of Justice Criminal Court Statistics Quarterly: January to March 2025 < https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2025/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2025 >accessed 14th January 2026.

3 Ministry of Justice Criminal Court Statistics Quarterly: April to June 2025 (Updated 30th September 2025) <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-april-to-june-2025/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-april-to-june-2025> accessed 14th January 2026.

4 Ministry of Justice “Criminal Court Statistics Quarterly: July to September 2025 – Crown Court: Increase in Cases Open For a Year or More” (Published 18th December 2025) <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-july-to-september-2025/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-july-to-september-2025#:~:text=Average%20waiting%20time%20at%20the%20Crown%20Court&text=The%20median%20waiting%20time%20for,7.7%20weeks%20in%20Q4%202019). > accessed 14th January 2026.

5 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (1950) ETS No 5, art 6(1)).

6 House of Lords ‘Judgements – Attorney General’s Reference No 2 of 2001 (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) [16] (Lord Bingham) <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd031211/ref2-1.htm > accessed 14th January 2026.

7 Gov.UK Justice Data “Courts Data Criminal Courts – Magistrates’ Open Caseload” Gov.UK < https://data.justice.gov.uk/courts/criminal-courts > accessed 14thJanuary 2026.

8 Press Release ‘Swift and Fair Justice Denied by Record Court Backlogs’ 18th December 2025 The Law Society < https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/contact-or-visit-us/press-office/press-releases/swift-and-fair-justice-denied-by-record-court-backlogs > accessed 14th January 2026.

9 Bianca Castro ‘Crown Court Backlog Reaches Record High with 77,000 Outstanding Cases’ 27th June 2025 The Law Society Gazette < https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/crown-court-backlog-reaches-record-high-of-77000-cases/5123721.article?utm_source=copilot.com > accessed 14th January 2026.

[1]0 National Audit office “Reducing the Backlog in the Crown Court’ 5th March 2025 Ministry of Justice and HM Courts & Tribunal Service HC 634 < https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/reducing-the-backlog-in-the-crown-court-1.pdf > accessed 14th January 2026.

11 Daniel Alge ‘Jury Trials: What the Government Plans To Limit Them Would Mean for Victims, Defendants and Courts’ 11th December 2025 Brunel University of London < https://www.brunel.ac.uk/news-and-events/news/articles/Jury-trials > accessed 14th January 2026.

12 Cassia Rowland ‘The Leveson Review – Cutting Jury Time Is Not The Only Option’ 11th July 2025 Institute for Government <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/comment/leveson-review-courts > accessed 14th January 2026.

[1]3 Gazette News Desk ‘Quarter of Jury Trials to be Axed as Lammy Unveils “Swift Courts” Plan’ 2nd December 2025 The Law Society Gazette < https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/quarter-of-jury-trials-to-be-axed-as-lammy-unveils-swift-courts-plan/5125305.article?utm_source=copilot.com > accessed 14thJanuary 2026.

[1]4 Magdalena Dominguez and Ben Zaranko ‘Transforming Justice: The Interplay of Social Change and Policy Reforms – Justice Spending in England and Wales’ 11th February 2025 Institute for Fiscal Studies < https://ifs.org.uk/publications/justice-spending-england-and-wales > accessed 14th January 2026.

[1]5 Magdalena Dominguez, Joe Tomlinson and Ben Zaranko ‘Crown Court Backlog Exacerbated by Post Pandemic Productivity Slump’ 6th June 2025 Institute for Fiscal Studies < https://ifs.org.uk/news/crown-court-backlog-exacerbated-post-pandemic-productivity-slump> accessed 14th January 2026.

[1]6 Dominic Casciani, Daniel Wainright ‘How Did The Court’s Backlog Get So Bad’ 18th December 2025 BBC News <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/czdg7r8de2lo > accessed 14th January 2026.

[1]7 ECHR Art 6(1).

[1]8 Ivana Roagna ‘Right to Trial Within Reasonable Time – Comparative Overview’ December 2022 European Union and The Council of Europe “Horizontal Facility for Western Balkans and Turkey 2019-2022” within the action “Initial for Legal Certainty in the West Balkans 1. 11-12 < https://rm.coe.int/right-to-a-trial-within-a-reasonable-time-hfii/1680aa3886 > accessed 14th January 2026.

[1]9 Dyer v Watson [2004] 1 AC 379; House of Lords ‘Judgements – Attorney General’s Reference No 2 of 2001 (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) [16] (Lord Bingham) < https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd031211/ref2-1.htm > accessed 14th January 2026; Case no 2122/64, Wemhoff v Federal Republic of Germany 1968] ECHR 2 Series A, No.7; Case no 1602/62 Stögmuller v Austria[1969] 1 EHRR 155; Case no 10073/82 H v France (1989) 12 EHRR 74; Case no 28523/95 Portington v Greece [1998] ECHR 26; Case no 19632/92 Guillemin v. France [1997] ECHR 18; Case no 648/02 Jan Zawadski v Poland Application [2010] ECHR.

20 R (On the application of Kehmal Mehmet) v The Secretary of State for Justice [2008] EWHC 1202 [6] - [10], [14] - [17], [21], [33] – [34] (Mr Justice Bean).

21Magdalena Dominguez and Ben Zaranko ‘Transforming Justice: The Interplay of Social Change and Policy Reforms – Justice Spending in England and Wales’ 11th February 2025 Institute for Fiscal Studies < https://ifs.org.uk/publications/justice-spending-england-and-wales > accessed 14th January 2026.

22 Cassia Rowland ‘Fixing Public Services: The Criminal Justice System’ 22nd July 2024 Institute for Government <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/fixing-public-services-labour-government/criminal-justice-system> accessed 14th January 2026; Insight ‘Are Our courts Fit for Purpose?’ 19th December 2022 The Law Society < https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/topics/research/are-our-courts-fit-for-purpose > accessed 14th January 2026; Georgina Sturge, Sally Lipscombe ‘Is The Criminal Justice System Fit for Purpose?’ 15th January 2020 UK Parliament House of Commons Library < https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/is-the-criminal-justice-system-fit-for-purpose/ > accessed 14th January 2026.

23 R (On the application of Kehmal Mehmet) v The Secretary of State for Justice [2008] EWHC 1202.

24 Nick Hodgson ‘Judicial System Facing Looming Crisis in Recruiting and Retaining Judges’ 28th February 2025 UCL News < https://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/2025/feb/judicial-system-facing-looming-crisis-recruiting-and-retaining-judges > accessed 14th January 2026; LexisNexis ‘Sir Andrew McFarlane Reports on Judge Shortages’ [November 2025] New Law Journal < https://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/content/sir-andrew-mcfarlane-reports-on-judge-shortages> accessed 14th January 2026.

25 Sir David Calvert-Smith ‘Complex and Lengthy Criminal Trials’ JUSTICE 2.14-2.22, 3.16, 3.21 and p 48 < https://files.justice.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/06170756/CLT-FINAL-ONLINE.pdf > accessed 14th January 2026.

26 Eckhart Schindler ‘Judicial Systems Are Turning to AI to Help Manage Vast Quantities of Data and Expedite case Resolution’ 4th February 2025 IBM < https://www.ibm.com/case-studies/blog/judicial-systems-are-turning-to-ai-to-help-manage-its-vast-quantities-of-data-and-expedite-case-resolution > accessed 14th January 2026.

27 Section 14 of the Crown Court Manual ‘Listing of Cases’ < https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Protocols/listing_crown_court_manual_050705.pdf?utm_source=copilot.com > accessed 15th January 2026.

28 R v PBN & Ors [2025] EWCA Crim 1442.

29 Insight ‘Are Our Courts Fit for Purpose?’ 19th December 2022 The Law Society < https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/topics/research/are-our-courts-fit-for-purpose > accessed 14th January 2026; Harry Clarke-Ezzidio ‘The British Justice System is Broken – And Its New IT System Is Making Things Worse’ 12th September 2022 The New Statesman < https://www.newstatesman.com/spotlight/tech-regulation/public-sector-tech/2022/09/common-platform-criminal-courts-justice-it-system-broken > accessed 15th January 2026.

30 Cassia Rowland ‘Performance Tracker 2025: Criminal Courts’ 23rd October 2025 Institute For Government < https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/performance-tracker-2025/criminal-justice/criminal-courts . Accessed 14th January 2026.

3[1] Richard Hyde ‘Limiting Jury Trials Won’t Save The Criminal Justice System’ 11th December 2025 London School of Economics < https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/limiting-jury-trials-wont-save-the-criminal-justice-system/ > accessed 14th January 2026.

32 Harvey Redgrave, Madeline Rolfe ‘A Plan to Reform The Criminal – Justice System’ 3rd October 2023 Tony Blair Institute for Global Change < https://institute.global/insights/public-services/a-plan-to-reform-the-criminal-justice-system> accessed 14th January 2026.

33 Harvey Redgrave, Madeline Rolfe ‘A Plan to Reform The Criminal – Justice System’ 3rd October 2023 Tony Blair Institute for Global Change 1, 31-35 < https://institute.global/insights/public-services/a-plan-to-reform-the-criminal-justice-system > accessed 14th January 2026.

34 Justice Committee ‘Ending The Cycle of Reoffending – Part One – Rehabilitation in Prisons’ UK Parliament <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5901/cmselect/cmjust/469/report.html > accessed 14th January 2026.

35 Dr Jay Gormley, Prof Melissa Hamilton and Dr Ian Belton ‘The Effectiveness of Sentencing Options on Reoffending’ 2022 Sentencing Council <https://sentencingcouncil.org.uk/media/rdzfopqp/effectiveness-of-sentencing-options-review-final.pdf > accessed 14thJanuary 2026.

36 ECHR art 6(1).

37 See Craig M Bradley ‘Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study (2nd edition Carolina Academic Press 2007) which outlines the composition of criminal courts in Germany; Tim Dowling ‘How Do Criminal Courts Work Without Juries Around the World?’ 9th July 2025 The Guardian < https://www.theguardian.com/law/2025/jul/09/how-do-criminal-courts-work-without-juries-around-the-world#:~:text=case%20against%20Simpson.-,Germany,of%20professional%20and%20lay%20judges. > accessed 15thJanuary 2026; Claire M Germain ‘Trials by Peers: The Ebb and Flow of the Criminal Jury in France and Belgium [2018] University of Florida Levin College of Law, UF Law Scholarship Repository < https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1845&context=facultypub > accessed 15th January 2026.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Cases

Domestic

Attorney General’s Reference (No 2 of 2001) [2003] UKHL 68

Dyer v Watson [2004] 1 AC 379

R (On the application of Kehmal Mehmet) v The Secretary of State for Justice [2008] EWHC 1202.

R v PBN & Ors [2025] EWCA Crim 1442

International

Guillemin v. France Case no 19632/92 [1997] ECtHR

H v France Case no 10073/82 [1989] 12 EHRR 74

Jan Zawadski v Poland Case no. 648/02 [2010] ECHR

Portington v Greece Case no 28523/95 [1998] ECtHR

Stögmuller v Austria Case no 1602/62 [1969] 1 EHRR 155

Wemhoff v Federal Republic of Germany Case no 2122/64 [1968] ECHR 2 Series A, No.7

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Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (1950) ETS No 5, art 6

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Hyde R ‘Limiting Jury Trials Won’t Save The Criminal Justice System’ 11th December 2025 London School of Economics < https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/limiting-jury-trials-wont-save-the-criminal-justice-system/ > accessed 14th January

2026

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Justice Committee ‘Ending The Cycle of Reoffending – Part One – Rehabilitation in Prisons’ UK Parliament <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5901/cmselect/cmjust/469/report.html > accessed 14th January 2026

LexisNexis ‘Sir Andrew McFarlane Reports on Judge Shortages’ [November 2025] New Law Journal < https://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/content/sir-andrew-mcfarlane-reports-on-judge-shortages > accessed 14th January 2026

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National Audit office “Reducing the Backlog in the Crown Court’ 5th March 2025 Ministry of Justice and HM Courts & Tribunal Service HC 634 < https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/reducing-the-backlog-in-the-crown-court-1.pdf > accessed 14th January 2026

Redgrave H, Rolfe M ‘A Plan to Reform The Criminal – Justice System’ 3rd October 2023 Tony Blair Institute for Global Change < https://institute.global/insights/public-services/a-plan-to-reform-the-criminal-justice-system > accessed 14thJanuary 2026

Roagna I ‘Right to Trial Within Reasonable Time – Comparative Overview’ December 2022 European Union and The Council of Europe “Horizontal Facility for Western Balkans and Turkey 2019-2022” within the action “Initial for Legal Certainty in the West Balkans < https://rm.coe.int/right-to-a-trial-within-a-reasonable-time-hfii/1680aa3886 > accessed 14th January 2026

Rowland C ‘Fixing Public Services: The Criminal Justice System’ 22nd July 2024 Institute for Government <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/fixing-public-services-labour-government/criminal-justice-system> accessed 14th January 2026

Rowland C ‘The Leveson Review – Cutting Jury Time Is Not The Only Option’ 11th July 2025 Institute for Government <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/comment/leveson-review-courts > accessed 14th January 2026

Rowland C ‘Performance Tracker 2025: Criminal Courts’ 23rd October 2025 Institute For Government < https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/performance-tracker-2025/criminal-justice/criminal-courts > Accessed 14th January 2026

Schindler E ‘Judicial Systems Are Turning to AI to Help Manage Vast Quantities of Data and Expedite case Resolution’ 4th February 2025 IBM < https://www.ibm.com/case-studies/blog/judicial-systems-are-turning-to-ai-to-help-manage-its-vast-quantities-of-data-and-expedite-case-resolution > accessed 14th January 2026

Section 14 of the Crown Court Manual ‘Listing of Cases’ < https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Protocols/listing_crown_court_manual_050705.pdf?utm_source=copilot.com > accessed 15th January 2026

Sturge G, Lipscombe S ‘Is The Criminal Justice System Fit for Purpose?’ 15th January 2020 UK Parliament House of Commons Library < https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/is-the-criminal-justice-system-fit-for-purpose/ > accessed 14thJanuary 2026

Author Elly (Elaine) is the founder of Menara Aspen Advisory, a boutique consultancy specialising in legal‑adjacent research, advisory writing, and document preparation. Her work spans structural reform, adjudicative design, comparative criminal justice, international, litigation and the emerging interface between law and technology, with research interests in modernising judicial processes and legal architecture. She is completing her final LLB module.

[2] Ministry of Justice Criminal Court Statistics Quarterly: January to March 2025 < https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2025/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2025>accessed 14th January 2026.

[3] Ministry of Justice Criminal Court Statistics Quarterly: April to June 2025 (Updated 30th September 2025) <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-april-to-june-2025/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-april-to-june-2025> accessed 14th January 2026.

[4] Ministry of Justice “Criminal Court Statistics Quarterly: July to September 2025 – Crown Court: Increase in Cases Open For a Year or More” (Published 18thDecember 2025) < https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-july-to-september-2025/criminal-court-statistics-quarterly-july-to-september-2025#:~:text=Average%20waiting%20time%20at%20the%20Crown%20Court&text=The%20median%20waiting%20time%20for,7.7%20weeks%20in%20Q4%202019). > accessed 14th January 2026.

[5] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (1950) ETS No 5, art 6(1).

[6] House of Lords ‘Judgements – Attorney General’s Reference No 2 of 2001 (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) [16] (Lord Bingham) < https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd031211/ref2-1.htm > accessed 14th January 2026.

[7] Gov.UK Justice Data “Courts Data Criminal Courts – Magistrates’ Open Caseload” Gov.UK < https://data.justice.gov.uk/courts/criminal-courts > accessed 14th January 2026.

[8] Press Release ‘Swift and Fair Justice Denied by Record Court Backlogs’ 18th December 2025 The Law Society <https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/contact-or-visit-us/press-office/press-releases/swift-and-fair-justice-denied-by-record-court-backlogs > accessed 14th January 2026.

[9] Bianca Castro ‘Crown Court Backlog Reaches Record High with 77,000 Outstanding Cases’ 27th June 2025 The Law Society Gazette < https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/crown-court-backlog-reaches-record-high-of-77000-cases/5123721.article?utm_source=copilot.com > accessed 14th January 2026.

[10] National Audit office “Reducing the Backlog in the Crown Court’ 5th March 2025 Ministry of Justice and HM Courts & Tribunal Service HC 634 < https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/reducing-the-backlog-in-the-crown-court-1.pdf > accessed 14th January 2026.

[11] Daniel Alge ‘Jury Trials: What the Government Plans To Limit Them Would Mean for Victims, Defendants and Courts’ 11th December 2025 Brunel University of London < https://www.brunel.ac.uk/news-and-events/news/articles/Jury-trials > accessed 14th January 2026.

[12] Cassia Rowland ‘The Leveson Review – Cutting Jury Time Is Not The Only Option’ 11th July 2025 Institute for Government < https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/comment/leveson-review-courts > accessed 14th January 2026.

[13] Gazette News Desk ‘Quarter of Jury Trials to be Axed as Lammy Unveils “Swift Courts” Plan’ 2nd December 2025 The Law Society Gazette < https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/quarter-of-jury-trials-to-be-axed-as-lammy-unveils-swift-courts-plan/5125305.article?utm_source=copilot.com > accessed 14th January 2026.

[14] Magdalena Dominguez and Ben Zaranko ‘Transforming Justice: The Interplay of Social Change and Policy Reforms – Justice Spending in England and Wales’ 11th February 2025 Institute for Fiscal Studies < https://ifs.org.uk/publications/justice-spending-england-and-wales > accessed 14th January 2026.

[15] Magdalena Dominguez, Joe Tomlinson and Ben Zaranko ‘Crown Court Backlog Exacerbated by Post Pandemic Productivity Slump’ 6th June 2025 Institute for Fiscal Studies < https://ifs.org.uk/news/crown-court-backlog-exacerbated-post-pandemic-productivity-slump > accessed 14th January 2026.

[16] Dominic Casciani, Daniel Wainright ‘How Did The Court’s Backlog Get So Bad’ 18th December 2025 BBC News < https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/czdg7r8de2lo > accessed 14th January 2026.

[17] ECHR Art 6(1).

[18] Ivana Roagna ‘Right to Trial Within Reasonable Time – Comparative Overview’ December 2022 European Union and The Council of Europe “Horizontal Facility for Western Balkans and Turkey 2019-2022” within the action “Initial for Legal Certainty in the West Balkans 1. 11-12 < https://rm.coe.int/right-to-a-trial-within-a-reasonable-time-hfii/1680aa3886 > accessed 14th January 2026.

[19] Dyer v Watson [2004] 1 AC 379; House of Lords ‘Judgements – Attorney General’s Reference No 2 of 2001 (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) [16] (Lord Bingham) <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldjudgmt/jd031211/ref2-1.htm > accessed 14th January 2026; Case no 2122/64, Wemhoff v Federal Republic of Germany 1968] ECHR 2 Series A, No.7; Case no 1602/62 Stögmuller v Austria [1969] 1 EHRR 155; Case no 10073/82 H v France (1989) 12 EHRR 74; Case no 28523/95 Portington v Greece [1998] ECHR 26; Case no 19632/92 Guillemin v. France [1997] ECHR 18; Case no 648/02 Jan Zawadski v Poland Application [2010] ECHR

[20] R (On the application of Kehmal Mehmet) v The Secretary of State for Justice [2008] EWHC 1202 [6] - [10], [14] - [17], [21], [33] – [34] (Mr Justice Bean).

[21] Magdalena Dominguez and Ben Zaranko ‘Transforming Justice: The Interplay of Social Change and Policy Reforms – Justice Spending in England and Wales’ 11th February 2025 Institute for Fiscal Studies < https://ifs.org.uk/publications/justice-spending-england-and-wales > accessed 14th January 2026.

[22] Cassia Rowland ‘Fixing Public Services: The Criminal Justice System’ 22nd July 2024 Institute for Government < https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/fixing-public-services-labour-government/criminal-justice-system > accessed 14th January 2026; Insight ‘Are Our courts Fit for Purpose?’ 19th December 2022 The Law Society < https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/topics/research/are-our-courts-fit-for-purpose > accessed 14th January 2026; Georgina Sturge, Sally Lipscombe ‘Is The Criminal Justice System Fit for Purpose?’ 15th January 2020 UK Parliament House of Commons Library < https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/is-the-criminal-justice-system-fit-for-purpose/ > accessed 14th January 2026.

[23] R (On the application of Kehmal Mehmet) v The Secretary of State for Justice [2008] EWHC 1202.

[24] Nick Hodgson ‘Judicial System Facing Looming Crisis in Recruiting and Retaining Judges’ 28th February 2025 UCL News < https://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/2025/feb/judicial-system-facing-looming-crisis-recruiting-and-retaining-judges > accessed 14th January 2026; LexisNexis ‘Sir Andrew McFarlane Reports on Judge Shortages’ [November 2025] New Law Journal < https://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/content/sir-andrew-mcfarlane-reports-on-judge-shortages > accessed 14th January 2026.

[25] Sir David Calvert-Smith ‘Complex and Lengthy Criminal Trials’ JUSTICE 2.14-2.22, 3.16, 3.21 and p 48 < https://files.justice.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/06170756/CLT-FINAL-ONLINE.pdf > accessed 14th January 2026.

[26] Eckhart Schindler ‘Judicial Systems Are Turning to AI to Help Manage Vast Quantities of Data and Expedite case Resolution’ 4th February 2025 IBM < https://www.ibm.com/case-studies/blog/judicial-systems-are-turning-to-ai-to-help-manage-its-vast-quantities-of-data-and-expedite-case-resolution > accessed 14thJanuary 2026.

[27] Section 14 of the Crown Court Manual ‘Listing of Cases’ < https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Protocols/listing_crown_court_manual_050705.pdf?utm_source=copilot.com > accessed 15th January 2026.

[28] R v PBN & Ors [2025] EWCA Crim 1442.

[29] Insight ‘Are Our Courts Fit for Purpose?’ 19th December 2022 The Law Society < https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/topics/research/are-our-courts-fit-for-purpose > accessed 14th January 2026; Harry Clarke-Ezzidio ‘The British Justice System is Broken – And Its New IT System Is Making Things Worse’ 12th September 2022 The New Statesman < https://www.newstatesman.com/spotlight/tech-regulation/public-sector-tech/2022/09/common-platform-criminal-courts-justice-it-system-broken > accessed 15th January 2026.

[30] Cassia Rowland ‘Performance Tracker 2025: Criminal Courts’ 23rd October 2025 Institute For Government < https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/performance-tracker-2025/criminal-justice/criminal-courts . Accessed 14th January 2026.

[31] Richard Hyde ‘Limiting Jury Trials Won’t Save The Criminal Justice System’ 11th December 2025 London School of Economics < https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/limiting-jury-trials-wont-save-the-criminal-justice-system/ > accessed 14th January 2026.

[32] Harvey Redgrave, Madeline Rolfe ‘A Plan to Reform The Criminal – Justice System’ 3rd October 2023 Tony Blair Institute for Global Change < https://institute.global/insights/public-services/a-plan-to-reform-the-criminal-justice-system > accessed 14th January 2026.

[33] Harvey Redgrave, Madeline Rolfe ‘A Plan to Reform The Criminal – Justice System’ 3rd October 2023 Tony Blair Institute for Global Change 1, 31-35 < https://institute.global/insights/public-services/a-plan-to-reform-the-criminal-justice-system > accessed 14th January 2026.

[34] Justice Committee ‘Ending The Cycle of Reoffending – Part One – Rehabilitation in Prisons’ UK Parliament < https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5901/cmselect/cmjust/469/report.html > accessed 14th January 2026.

[35] Dr Jay Gormley, Prof Melissa Hamilton and Dr Ian Belton ‘The Effectiveness of Sentencing Options on Reoffending’ 2022 Sentencing Council < https://sentencingcouncil.org.uk/media/rdzfopqp/effectiveness-of-sentencing-options-review-final.pdf > accessed 14th January 2026.

[36] ECHR art 6(1).

[37] See Craig M Bradley ‘Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study (2nd edition Carolina Academic Press 2007) which outlines the composition of criminal courts in Germany; Tim Dowling ‘How Do Criminal Courts Work Without Juries Around the World?’ 9th July 2025 The Guardian < https://www.theguardian.com/law/2025/jul/09/how-do-criminal-courts-work-without-juries-around-the-world#:~:text=case%20against%20Simpson.-,Germany,of%20professional%20and%20lay%20judges. > accessed 15th January 2026; Claire M Germain ‘Trials by Peers: The Ebb and Flow of the Criminal Jury in France and Belgium [2018] University of Florida Levin College of Law, UF Law Scholarship Repository < https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1845&context=facultypub > accessed 15th January 2026..